The Supreme Court’s Madras Bar Association judgment marks a decisive moment in the judiciary–executive tussle over tribunals, reaffirming judicial primacy in appointments and tenure, and striking down legislative attempts to reassert executive control over adjudicatory bodies.
Thank you for reading this post, don't forget to subscribe!
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court’s judgment in Madras Bar Association v Union of India (2025) (MBA 2020) marks the latest and perhaps sharpest chapter in the long-running tussle between the judiciary and the executive over the control of tribunals in India. By striking down the Tribunals Reform Act, 2021, as unconstitutional and violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, the Court has reaffirmed its insistence on judicial primacy in tribunal appointments and service conditions.
The verdict, delivered by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, with Justice K. Vinod Chandran, is not merely about tribunals. It is about who ultimately controls adjudication in a constitutional democracy, the executive-backed legislature or an independent judiciary.
Why Tribunals Matter in the Judiciary–Executive Conflict
Tribunals adjudicate disputes in critical areas, including taxation, company law, service matters, and disputes involving the armed forces. Over time, Parliament has shifted substantial jurisdiction from High Courts to tribunals under Articles 323A and 323B, introduced during the Emergency through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment.
However, unlike constitutional courts, tribunals lack entrenched safeguards of independence. This has made them a recurring site of friction, with governments seeking administrative control and courts insisting on constitutional insulation.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, from L Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) to Union of India v R Gandhi (2010), tribunals exercising court-like powers must possess equivalent independence, security of tenure, and institutional autonomy.
The 2017–2025 Legislative
Finance Act 2017
The conflict intensified when the Finance Act, 2017, empowered the Union government to frame uniform rules governing tribunal appointments and tenure. The resulting 2017 Rules gave the executive a dominant role in selection committees and imposed short three-year tenures.
Rojer Mathew (2019)
In Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank (2019), a Constitution Bench struck down these rules, holding that executive dominance in appointments violates the separation of powers.
MBA 2020 & 2021
When revised rules and a subsequent ordinance continued to prescribe four-year tenures, minimum age limits, and two-name recommendations to the executive, the Supreme Court struck them down again, warning against “impermissible legislative override.”
Yet Parliament responded by enacting the Tribunals Reform Act, 2021, which substantially reenacted the very provisions the Court had invalidated.
MBA 2025: Supreme Court Draws a Constitutional Line
In MBA 2025, the Court held that Parliament cannot simply repackage a law already declared unconstitutional. While acknowledging legislative competence, the Court emphasised that:
- Parliament must cure constitutional defects, not ignore them
- Judicial directions safeguarding independence are binding, not advisory
- Tribunal independence flows directly from the separation of powers and judicial independence, both part of the basic structure
Justice Chandran’s concurrence memorably described the Act as “old wine in a new bottle”, underscoring the Court’s frustration with repeated defiance.
The Verdict:
The Supreme Court struck down key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, relating to the appointment and tenure of tribunal members, holding them unconstitutional. The Court found that the Centre had reintroduced provisions earlier invalidated by the Court with only minor changes, amounting to a legislative override that violated judicial independence and the separation of powers.
Reprimanding the government for repeatedly ignoring binding precedents, the Court directed that earlier rulings in the Madras Bar Association (MBA-4 and MBA-5) cases will continue to govern tribunal appointments and tenure. It also ordered the Union government to establish a National Tribunals Commission within three months, stressing that piecemeal reforms cannot fix systemic flaws in the tribunal framework.
Judiciary vs Executive: What is The Real Dispute?
At its core, the dispute is about control:
- The executive argues that tribunals are statutory bodies and their administration, appointments, and service conditions fall within legislative discretion.
- The judiciary insists that once tribunals replace courts, constitutional minimums of independence apply, regardless of their statutory origin.
The Court has not excluded Parliament from the process. Instead, it has laid down a constitutional floor:
- Judicial dominance in selection committees
- Minimum five-year tenure
- Protection from executive leverage through reappointments
Parliament may go beyond these standards, but not below them.
Earlier, Attorney General R. Venkataramani clarified that his request to postpone the Madras Bar Association (MBA) case hearing before the Supreme Court was not intended to delay proceedings, but was due to his involvement in a crucial arbitration matter between the Government of India and Reliance Ltd. under a Production Sharing Contract.
This clarification followed strong remarks by Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai, who expressed displeasure over repeated adjournment requests, especially as they came shortly before his retirement. The CJI suggested that the delays appeared to be an attempt to push the hearing beyond his tenure, noting that the Court had already accommodated the Attorney General multiple times.
The Court emphasized the importance of timely hearings in significant constitutional matters like the MBA case, which challenges provisions of the Tribunal Reform Act, 2021. The case raises key issues regarding tribunal reforms, judicial independence, and separation of powers, with the government defending the Act as constitutionally valid and necessary to streamline the tribunal system.
Overall, the episode reflects a growing tension between the Court and the government over repeated delays in resolving long-pending, high-stakes constitutional disputes.
Fallout: Vacancies, Delay, and Administrative Breakdown
This prolonged standoff has had serious real-world consequences. Many tribunals remain severely understaffed, with some described by the Supreme Court itself as “virtually defunct”. The uncertainty surrounding appointments under an unconstitutional regime has discouraged candidates and stalled adjudication.
Ironically, the executive’s insistence on control has undermined the very efficiency tribunals were meant to achieve.
The MBA 2025 judgment is significant not only for tribunal reform but also for India’s broader constitutional culture. It sends a clear message that:
- Judicial decisions cannot be nullified by legislative stubbornness
- The rule of law demands constitutional good faith
- Separation of powers is not symbolic, but operational
By invoking Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Court framed the issue as one of constitutional morality, not institutional ego.
Conclusion
The judiciary–executive tussle over tribunals reflects a deeper tension in Indian constitutional governance. While Parliament seeks administrative flexibility, the Supreme Court remains the sentinel of institutional independence.
In MBA 2025, the Court has asserted that efficiency cannot come at the cost of independence, and that adjudication, whether by courts or tribunals, must remain free from executive control.
Click Here to Read More Reports On Tribunals Reform Act
