The Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled that not all cases under Section 498A IPC amount to offences involving moral turpitude. Justice Sandeep Moudgil rejected views treating such convictions as grounds for removing public servants from service.
PUNJAB: The Punjab and Haryana High Court recently held that not every case filed under Section 498A (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code can be treated as an offence involving moral turpitude.
Justice Sandeep Moudgil disagreed with certain High Courts that have categorized convictions under Section 498-A IPC as offences involving moral turpitude for the purpose of removing public servants from their posts.
The Bench observed,
“With all humility at my command, a careful distinction becomes necessary, on the one hand, between the genuine cases of egregious dowry-related cruelty which shock the collective conscience of the society as a whole, and, on the other hand, prosecutions arising out of essentially personal disputes within the precincts of the matrimonial home, which may culminate in compromise, acquittal, or even conviction based on findings of only technical or marginal cruelty,”
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In 1996, the Supreme Court defined moral turpitude as conduct that is “inherently base, depraved or contrary to accepted standards of morality”. In India, convictions for offences involving moral turpitude often lead to disqualification from public employment.
Recently, the Madhya Pradesh High Court sustained the dismissal of an employee convicted under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, finding that dowry demands are tantamount to ‘moral turpitude’ because they are linked with greed. The High Courts of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh have issued similar rulings.
Justice Moudgil noted that there is no uniform judicial position at present on whether every conviction under Section 498-A IPC amounts to an offence involving moral turpitude. He observed that reasonable minds may differ on whether a specific case under Section 498-A IPC involves moral turpitude.
The Court stated,
“What cannot be accepted, however, is any general rule that every offence under Section 498-A IPC, by its very nature, must automatically be translated into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences such as employment, promotion or higher education,”
The Bench added that because Section 498A cases stem from conduct within the intimate sphere of matrimonial relationships, not every prosecution under the provision is necessarily a matter of public concern.
The court said,
“To elevate every prosecution under Section 498-A, irrespective of its factual substratum, into an ‘offence against society’ and, on that abstract footing, to brand it in all cases as an offence involving moral turpitude, is a proposition which cannot withstand legal scrutiny. If that idea is accepted, then almost every offence in the Indian Penal Code or Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita could easily be described as dealing with a ‘societal’ problem, and almost every conviction would have to be treated as involving moral turpitude. This would wipe out the important difference between ordinary criminal offences and only those acts which are so base, vile, depraved or so shocking to the public conscience, that they deserve to be characterised against involving ‘moral turpitude’.”
The Court held that the label of moral turpitude should be applied only where the facts reveal genuine moral depravity, not merely strained matrimonial relations.
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These remarks were made while granting relief to a State Bank of India branch manager who was dismissed from service in 2018 after his conviction under Section 498-A IPC; he was acquitted of the dowry death charge. The High Court set aside the discharge, stating that a disciplinary authority cannot simply rely on the phrase “conviction involving moral turpitude” to terminate employment.
The authority must assess the nature of the offence, its connection to official duties, surrounding circumstances, the employee’s service record, and whether the punishment is proportionate, the Court said.
The Court ordered,
The impugned order dated 27.06.2019 (Annexure P5) whereby the services of the respondents have been discharged from 14.12.2018 is hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to grant all consequential benefits to the petitioner from 15.12.2018 along with interest @ 6% p.a. within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order,”
Advocate Karnail Singh appeared for the petitioner. Senior Advocate Dheeraj Jain with Advocate Sahil Garg represented the Union of India. Advocate Madhu Dayal represented the other respondents.
Case Title: Brahmjeet Kaushal v. Union of India & Ors
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