The Allahabad High Court held that the POCSO Act and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act override Muslim Personal Law, ruling that child marriage laws apply equally to all religions. The Court refused to quash an FIR over an alleged attempt to marry a 16-year-old girl.
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has held that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) override Muslim Personal Law in matters relating to child marriage.
The Court observed that no personal law can permit the marriage of a girl below 18 years of age when Parliament has enacted laws prohibiting child marriage and protecting children from sexual offences.
A Division Bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev dismissed a writ petition filed by Rubi and 18 others seeking quashing of an FIR registered after police and a Child Line team allegedly stopped the marriage of a 16-year-old girl in Bulandshahr.
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According to the FIR, police officials and members of the Child Line Team received information that a minor girl named Sonam, aged about 16 years, was about to be married in Village Sunpeda Baksuwa in Bulandshahr district. Acting on the information, the police and Child Line officials reached the village to prevent the child marriage and informed the girl’s parents that she would be produced before the Child Welfare Committee.
The FIR alleged that nineteen named persons, along with around fifty unidentified persons, abused, threatened and obstructed the police and Child Line officials while they were performing their official duties. It was further alleged that the minor girl was forcibly taken away from the custody of a Child Line case worker before she was eventually rescued by the authorities. Based on these allegations, offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita were registered against the petitioners.
Before the High Court, counsel for the petitioners argued that under Muslim Personal Law, a girl who has attained puberty, generally presumed at the age of 15 years, is competent to marry. It was further submitted that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act does not override Muslim Personal Law and reliance was placed on the provisions of the Majority Act, 1875 and the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.
Rejecting these submissions, the High Court made it clear that Parliament has enacted the PCMA and the POCSO Act to protect children and these statutes apply uniformly to all citizens irrespective of religion.
The Court observed,
“The age of marriage, in our considered opinion, for every citizen of the country, irrespective of religion, is that, that is spelt out by the PCMA.”
The Court said,
“The Shariat Law providing for puberty as the competent age under the law permissible for a girl to marry or be married, runs clearly in the teeth of the PCMA as well as the POCSO Act,”
The Bench further held that permitting the marriage of a child below 18 years would inevitably lead to conflict with the POCSO Act because sexual relations within such a marriage would amount to an offence under the statute.
The Court said,
“The PCMA and the POCSO Act are statutes that are based on public health and national policy in this regard. They have a scientific understanding to them, legislatively translated into prohibitory statutes and there can be no escape from it for anyone.”
The High Court referred extensively to decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court dealing with the interaction between Muslim Personal Law, the PCMA and the POCSO Act. It noted that although there have been conflicting judicial opinions, the Supreme Court has not yet delivered an authoritative ruling finally settling the issue.
Nevertheless, the Bench expressed complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Kerala High Court in Moidutty Musliyar, which held that no personal law can override the prohibition against child marriage under the PCMA or dilute the protection granted under the POCSO Act.
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The Court also examined the Supreme Court’s observations in Society for Enlightenment & Voluntary Action v. Union of India, where the apex court highlighted the need for legislative clarity regarding the relationship between personal laws and the PCMA. It further noted that the proposed Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amendhttps://lawchakra.in/other-courts/thane-rickshaw-driver-acquitted-in-pocso/ment) Bill, 2021, which intended to expressly give overriding effect to the PCMA over personal laws, had lapsed after the dissolution of the 17th Lok Sabha.
Despite the absence of a final Supreme Court ruling, the Allahabad High Court held that it was free to decide the issue based on the existing legal framework.
The Bench categorically observed,
“The Shariat Law providing for puberty as the competent age under the law permissible for a girl to marry or be married, runs clearly in the teeth of the PCMA as well as the POCSO Act.”
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that the police and Child Line Team had acted lawfully while preventing the proposed marriage of the minor girl. Their actions were aimed at enforcing the provisions of the PCMA and preventing a possible violation of the POCSO Act.
The Court appreciated the actions of the authorities and observed that the allegations in the FIR disclosed a serious attack on public servants performing their official duties. According to the FIR, the police officials and Child Line personnel were abused, threatened and assaulted while trying to rescue the child, and the victim was forcibly taken away before being recovered.
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The Court held that these allegations clearly disclosed cognizable offences requiring a full investigation. It rejected the petitioners’ contention that certain offences were not made out or that there was no independent witness to the incident, observing that such questions could only be examined after investigation.
The Bench concluded that it was not a fit case for exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the FIR at the initial stage of investigation.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, vacated the interim protection earlier granted to the petitioners and directed that its order be communicated to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bulandshahr, and the Station House Officer of Police Station Kakor for compliance.
Case Title: : Rubi and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
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