The Allahabad High Court held that although some schools of Muslim personal law allow marriage once a person attains puberty, this recognition cannot extend to a live-in relationship. The court clarified that such relationships remain outside recognised boundaries.
The Allahabad High Court ruled that even if certain schools of Muslim personal law permit marriage upon attaining puberty, such recognition cannot be extended to a live-in relationship outside marriage.
The Court also denied relief to an interfaith couple where the male partner had not yet turned 21.
Justice Garima Prashad noted that the petitioners had not claimed to have solemnised a nikah, and it was admitted that they were living together in a relationship outside marriage.
The Court held that Muslim personal law therefore offered them no assistance.
The Court further clarified that even if any personal law were more permissive, the secular statutory framework governing marriage particularly the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 sets a higher threshold that the Court is required to follow.
Citing the legislative scheme treating a male below 21 years as lacking legal capacity to marry, the Court concluded that what cannot be accomplished through a valid secular marriage or a legally recognised marriage under the applicable personal-law framework cannot be judicially reconstituted as a sanctioned live-in arrangement.
The matter arose from a writ petition filed by a 20-year-old Muslim woman and her 19-year-old Hindu partner. They sought protection for their life and liberty under Article 21, stating that they were residing together.
The couple alleged that the woman’s father was threatening them and pressing them to separate. They argued that they could not solemnise marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 because the male petitioner had not yet attained 21 years of age the statutory minimum for a groom.
They claimed, nevertheless, that as consenting adults they had a right to live together and requested directions restraining family members from interfering.
The State opposed the petition, contending that granting protection to such a relationship would undermine the statutory scheme under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
It argued that Parliament had intentionally treated a male below 21 years as lacking legal capacity to marry, and that courts could not indirectly permit a marriage-like arrangement through a live-in relationship.
Framing the central question as whether the Court could, in writ jurisdiction, protect a live-in relationship where the male partner was below 21 and therefore legally classified as a child for marriage purposes, the Court examined the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.
It observed that the statute creates a marriage-specific incapacity by treating males below 21 years as children for marriage-related purposes, even if they are otherwise majors under general law. The Court noted that the law is designed not only to label child marriage but to prevent and discourage it through penal and preventive provisions.
On the Muslim personal law issue, Justice Prashad held that the petitioners were not asserting the existence of a valid Muslim marriage. She stated that even if some doctrines of Muslim law recognise marriage on attaining puberty, those principles relate to marriage itself, not to live-in arrangements outside marriage.
The Court also took note that the petitioners admitted they were living together as a live-in couple precisely because they could not marry under the law at present. In those circumstances, the Court held, the live-in arrangement operates as a substitute for marriage, and protecting it would amount to indirectly sanctioning a presently impermissible marriage-like relationship.
The Court also clarified that while parents or guardians cannot resort to threats, violence, coercion, or illegal confinement, they cannot be barred from pursuing lawful remedies under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 such as approaching the police or the Child Marriage Prohibition Officers.
Relying on Supreme Court decisions on live-in relationships and personal liberty including Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (2006), Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018), and Nandakumar v. State of Kerala (2018) the High Court noted that those cases involved legally competent adults and do not authorise courts to override statutory age restrictions governing marriage.
Finding that the petition contained only vague assertions without specific particulars of any unlawful threats or acts, the Court dismissed the writ petition and declined to grant the protection sought by the couple.
Case Title: Shajiya Parveen And Another Vs. State Of U.P. And 3 Others