The criminal process cannot be used as a weapon to settle political scores or to stifle legitimate political dissent, the Madras High Court held, quashing a Section 153A complaint against former Tamil Nadu BJP chief K. Annamalai over a 2023 speech, finding no intent to promote communal enmity and no reference to two identifiable communities.
Chennai: The Madras High Court has quashed a private complaint, and the trial court’s cognizance order, against former Tamil Nadu BJP State President K. Annamalai for offences under Sections 153A and 505(1)(c) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), holding that a mere reference to a historical incident in the course of political discourse, absent any intention or tendency to promote communal disharmony, does not attract those provisions [Annamalai K v. Piyush V.].
Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan, allowing the petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), held that the essential ingredients of the offences were not made out and that permitting the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
The complaint
The complaint, lodged by the respondent, alleged that during September 2023 the petitioner had, in the course of public meetings, circulated a statement attributing certain remarks to the late leader Muthuramalingam Thevar concerning the Madurai Meenakshi temple, which, the complainant alleged, was never made and which several publications later rebutted. According to the complainant, the statement was not a mere reference to a historical incident but was deliberately embellished with inflammatory elements to promote feelings of hatred and enmity between believers and non-believers, and thus had the tendency to promote communal disharmony. (LawChakra is not reproducing the contested remarks, which the Court found did not, in context, disclose any offence.)
After the police did not act on his representation, the complainant instituted a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., and the Judicial Magistrate No. IV, Salem, took cognizance under Sections 153A and 505(1)(c) IPC and issued summons. The petitioner moved the High Court to quash those proceedings, contending that, even taking the allegations at their highest, no offence was disclosed, that there was no mens rea or likelihood of harm to public tranquillity, and that he had merely referred to a historical incident in political discourse without any incitement or threat.
‘No reference to two identifiable communities’
The Court’s analysis turned on the settled ingredients of Section 153A, which penalises the promotion of enmity between “different” groups. It held that the words attributed to the petitioner did not refer to any two or more identifiable groups or communities, and that the statement had been made as a political response to remarks attributed to a member of another political party, consisting of a reference to an incident the petitioner believed to have occurred in the past.
There was no material, the Court found, to indicate that the statement was intended to promote communal disharmony or to incite violence or enmity between different communities, nor any material to show that it had resulted in, or was likely to result in, actual or imminent disharmony or violence. “Mere reference to a historical incident, without any demonstrable tendency or intention to promote such disharmony,” the Court held, “cannot, by itself, attract the penal provision under Section 153A of the IPC.”
Mens rea and reading the speech ‘as a whole’
The Court emphasised that the presence of the requisite mens rea, the intention to promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between communities, is an essential ingredient of Section 153A, and that such intention must be established from the material on record and cannot be “mechanically inferred merely from isolated or strongly worded expressions.” The intention to cause disorder or incite violence, it held, is the sine qua non of the offence, to be assessed from the language used, the context and the surrounding circumstances.
Applying the settled rule of construction, the Court held that a speech must be read and understood as a whole and in its proper context, and that a court cannot rely on isolated or strongly-worded passages severed from their context, nor “a sentence here and a sentence there” selectively picked up and connected through inferential reasoning to sustain a criminal charge. Read as a whole, the Court found, the statement did not have the tendency to promote disharmony or enmity between communities, did not target or denigrate any particular community, and was made in the course of a political response, so that the ingredients of Section 153A were not made out. For the same reasons, and in the absence of any material that the speech disturbed or was likely to disturb public tranquillity, the offence under Section 505(1)(c) was also not attracted.
‘Criminal process cannot settle political scores’
The Court noted that the circumstances gave rise to a serious contention that the complaint had been instituted with an ulterior motive, but held that it need not record a conclusive finding on the alleged political motive, since the proceedings were in any event liable to be quashed for want of the basic ingredients of the offences. It then made observations on the misuse of the criminal law against political speech:
“The criminal process cannot be permitted to be used as a weapon for settling political scores or to stifle legitimate political dissent. At the same time, the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is subject to the reasonable restrictions prescribed by law.”
Noting the manner and timing of the complaint and the absence of any prima facie material that the speech was intended or likely to incite violence or disturb public tranquillity, the Court held that permitting the proceedings to continue would serve no legitimate purpose and would amount to allowing the criminal process to be used for purposes other than the bona fide enforcement of law. It accordingly quashed the complaint in C.C. No. 306 of 2026 and the cognizance order, and allowed the petition.
Why the judgment matters
The judgment is a clear application of the well-settled safeguards that confine Section 153A, a provision frequently invoked against political and public speech. It reaffirms three limiting principles: that the offence requires the promotion of enmity between at least two identifiable communities, so a statement not directed at such groups falls outside it; that mens rea, a genuine intention or tendency to incite disharmony, is indispensable and cannot be inferred from strong or provocative wording alone; and that a speech must be judged as a whole and in context, not by isolating stray passages. These principles, drawn from a long line of Supreme Court authority, are what prevent hate-speech provisions from becoming a tool to criminalise every contentious political statement.
Equally significant is the Court’s caution against the weaponisation of the criminal process for political ends. By observing that criminal proceedings cannot be used to settle political scores or to stifle legitimate dissent, while affirming that free speech under Article 19(1)(a) remains subject to reasonable restrictions, the Court situated the case within the broader tension between robust political expression and the limits the law places on speech that genuinely incites communal hostility. The decision does not, and expressly declines to, pronounce on the truth of the underlying historical claim or on the complainant’s alleged motive; it holds only that, on the material, the ingredients of the offences were absent, and that the prosecution could not be allowed to continue.
Case Title: Annamalai K v. Piyush V. [Crl.O.P. No. 9798 of 2026]
Bench: Justice G.K. Ilanthiraiyan, Madras High Court
Date of Order: September 24, 2026