Looking for Another Job with Rival Company Is a Basic Right, Doesn’t Constitute Moral Turpitude: Calcutta High Court

Thank you for reading this post, don't forget to subscribe!

The Calcutta High Court ruled that seeking employment with a rival company, especially for better perks and facilities, is a fundamental right. The court emphasized that such action does not amount to moral turpitude or breach of good morals.

The Calcutta High Court upheld an order requiring a company to pay gratuity to a terminated employee, stating that seeking employment, even with a competing firm offering better benefits, is a fundamental right and does not amount to moral turpitude.

The Writ Application filed against decisions made by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority.

Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul), in a Single Bench, remarked,

“Thus looking for another job, even if with a rival company (though, not proved in this case) with better perks and facilities is a basic right and does not constitute moral turpitude as it is not contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals.”

Advocate Nayan Rakshit represented the Petitioner, while Advocate Atanu Biswas represented the Respondent.

The private respondent had been employed as a technician at the petitioner company and held a responsible position, giving him access to various proprietary processes and confidential information developed over years.

However, he was found to have breached his employment terms by acting as a middleman for another company and attempting to establish a Capacitor Film Manufacturing plant. Following evidence of these actions, the company issued a show cause notice and suspended him.

Based on the enquiry officer’s report, the private respondent was terminated. Subsequently, the Controlling Authority ordered the company to pay a gratuity amount of Rs.1,37,308 with interest. Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed, but the Appellate Authority upheld the Controlling Authority’s decision, prompting the writ application to the High Court.

Upon reviewing the case, the Bench noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any damage or loss caused by the respondent’s actions that could be categorized as riotous, disorderly, or morally corrupt.

The enquiry report indicated that the petitioner could not produce witnesses or call records to verify the claim that the respondent contacted a rival company.

The testimonies provided only mentioned seeing the respondent conversing with personnel from the rival firm. The Bench concluded that the conduct of the enquiry and the disciplinary authority constituted an abuse of power and violated principles of natural justice, as there were no specific findings against the petitioner.

Citing the judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh (2020), the Bench stated that the conclusions drawn by the Disciplinary Authority were based on “no evidence” and did not adhere to natural justice principles, leading to a perverse determination of fact.

The Bench determined that the order in question did not require modification, as the appellate authority had neither interfered with the disciplinary proceedings nor the punishment.

It affirmed that the appellate authority acted within its rights under the gratuity payment provisions to assess the case based on merit regarding entitlement and forfeiture of gratuity, ultimately dismissing the application.

It concluded,

“The order of the appellate authority is well reasoned and within jurisdiction to the extent of the provisions of the payment of gratuity and is clearly in accordance with law,”

Case Title: M/s. Xpro India Limited. Vs. The State of West Bengal (Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:1674)




Similar Posts