



1 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:13172

W.P. No. 10092/2026

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH
AT INDORE**

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE JAI KUMAR PILLAI

WRIT PETITION No. 10092 of 2026

LOKENDERA SINGH HIHORE

Versus

***STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HOME, MANTRALAYA,
VALLABH BHAWAN BHOPAL AND OTHERS***

Appearance:

Ms.Mini Ravindran - Advocate for the petitioner.

Shri Sudeep Bhargav - Dy.A.G. with Shri Kushagra Singh –

Dy.G.A for the respondents/State.

Reserved on : 27/04/2026

Post on : 07/05/2026

ORDER



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Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has approached this Court assailing the impugned suspension order dated 11.03.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent Superintendent of Police, District Indore (Gramin).

2. By way of the instant petition, the petitioner fundamentally seeks the relief of a writ of mandamus for the quashment of the aforesaid suspension order, coupled with a consequential direction commanding the respondents to permit the petitioner to continue discharging his duties on the post of Police Station Incharge (SHO), Police Station Manpur, District Indore, along with the costs of the litigation.

Facts of the Case

3. Briefly stated, the factual matrix of the case reveals that the petitioner is a 2007 batch Sub Inspector of Police who, prior to the passing of the impugned order, was posted as the Police Station Incharge, Manpur. The petitioner claims a highly decorated career trajectory, having been the recipient of more than 300 awards, maintaining an A+ ACR credential, and securing letters of appreciation for exemplary investigation skills from various esteemed bodies, including the Department of Justice, the Federal



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Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the US Embassy in the widely reported Jam Gate incident.

4. The genesis of the present dispute lies in the events that transpired on the intervening night of 10.03.2026 and 11.03.2026. The record indicates that at approximately 23:19 hours, while the petitioner was undertaking his regular night patrolling duties duly recorded in the *rojnamcha* (*Annexure P/3 and Annexure P/4*), he received specific intelligence from an informant regarding large-scale illegal gambling activities being orchestrated at a secluded farmhouse known as ‘Kothi Niwas’ situated in Gram Avlipura.

5. It is undisputed on record that upon receiving the said intelligence, the petitioner promptly requisitioned a search warrant, mobilized the requisite police force along with independent witnesses, and conducted a raid on the said premises. During the raid, more than 20 individuals were found indulging in illegal gambling, leading to the seizure of substantial cash, mobile phones, and vehicles from the spot. It subsequently emerged that the said farmhouse belonged to a sitting IAS official presently posted as Managing Director in the M.P Finance Corporation, Indore.

6. The pleadings further reflect that immediately after the successful raid, the petitioner was subjected to immense pressure



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and threats from various quarters attempting to coerce him into either not registering the FIR or altering the actual place of occurrence to shield the identity of the farmhouse. Demonstrating steadfast adherence to his duties, the petitioner did not cave into such demands and directed the registration of the FIR on 11.03.2026, explicitly naming the actual crime scene. Perturbed by this unyielding discharge of duty and the subsequent media coverage, the respondent authority issued the impugned suspension order on the very morning of 11.03.2026.

Contentions of the Petitioner

7. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argues that the entire action of the respondents is *ex-facie* illegal, arbitrary, and a classic example of a blatant abuse of administrative power. It is contended that the suspension is a vindictive and *malafide* counter-blast intended solely to penalize an honest officer for diligently discharging his duty and refusing to suppress the involvement of an IAS officer's property in an organized gambling racket.

8. It is the categorical assertion of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed in complete derogation of Rule 9 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)



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Rules, 1966. On the date of the suspension, neither was any disciplinary enquiry pending or contemplated against the petitioner, nor was he facing investigation or trial for any criminal offence. The preliminary enquiry was merely an afterthought to justify a predetermined and high-handed executive action.

9. Drawing the attention of this Court to the vice of gross non-application of mind, the petitioner submits that the hastily drafted suspension order simultaneously suspended ASI Resham Girwal, who was admittedly on sanctioned medical leave on the date of the incident. Furthermore, highlighting the discriminatory intent of the respondents, it is pointed out that under identical factual circumstances, a massive gambling racket was busted in the jurisdiction of Simrol Police Station, Indore on 15.03.2026, yet no such punitive suspension was inflicted upon the SHO of that station.

10. To circumvent the preliminary bar of alternative remedy, it is strenuously urged that the statutory appeal is entirely illusory and inefficacious in the present factual scenario. The impugned action was allegedly dictated by highly placed officials, and the Appellate Authority (Inspector General) has already manifested undue haste by passing a consequential order on 18.03.2026, transferring the



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petitioner's headquarters from Indore to Burhanpur immediately upon gaining knowledge of the institution of the present writ petition.

Contentions of the Respondents

11. *Per contra*, repelling the contentions of the petitioner, the State has filed its return raising a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition. Placing reliance on the judicial pronouncement reported in **2022 (4) MPLJ 100**, the respondents vehemently submit that the petitioner possesses an efficacious and alternative statutory remedy of appeal under the M.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966, and therefore, the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 ought not to be invoked.

12. Defending the impugned administrative action, it is submitted on behalf of the State that the petitioner was suspended strictly on account of his failure to comply with the general directions issued by higher authorities in crime review meetings regarding the curbing of illegal activities and strengthening of intelligence gathering. The respondents emphatically state that the suspension was passed purely in contemplation of a departmental enquiry as mandated under the rules.

13. Elaborating upon the preliminary enquiry (Annexure R/1), the respondents contend that the petitioner was prima facie found

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guilty of negligence. It is further argued that the petitioner, being the Station House Officer, held the overall supervisory command of the area and cannot claim parity with subordinate officials like ASI Resham Girwal or SI Mithun Osari, whose suspensions were subsequently revoked upon a distinct factual assessment of their respective roles.

14. Refuting the petitioner's claim of an unblemished and stellar career, the respondents have placed on record an order (Annexure R/3) demonstrating that the petitioner had previously faced departmental proceedings culminating in a minor penalty of censure in the year 2013. The allegations of malafides and extraneous pressure are flatly denied as being bald, misconceived, and devoid of any cogent evidentiary backing.

Analysis and Conclusion

15. Having heard the rival contentions at length and upon a meticulous perusal of the record, the foundational question that falls for the consideration of this Court is whether the impugned suspension order withstands the scrutiny of law. At the outset, this Court is conscious of the settled legal paradigm that normally, a Constitutional Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 refrains from interfering with suspension orders, as the same fall



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squarely within the administrative prerogative of the disciplinary authority.

16. At the threshold, it is apposite to reproduce the impugned suspension order dated 11.03.2026 (Annexure P/1), which reads as under:

“दिनांक 10.03.2026 को थाना मानपुर क्षेत्रांतर्गत कोठी निवास फार्म हाउस ग्राम आवलीपुरा में बड़े पैमाने पर कुछ व्यक्तियों द्वारा अवैध रूप से जुओं खेला जा रहा था। जुओं खेल रहे व्यक्तियों को निरीक्षक लोकेन्द्र सिंह हिहोर थाना प्रभारी मानपुर एवं अन्य पुलिस अधिकारियों/कर्मचारियों द्वारा पकड़ा गया। मौके पर पकड़े गये व्यक्तियों से 30 मोबाईल, 02 चार पहिया वाहन एक स्वीफ्ट डिजायर कार नं. MP09 WD 1950 एवं हुन्डई ओरा कार नम्बर MP09 AP 0487 एवं नगदी राशि 13,67,971/- रूपये जप्त किये गये।

मेरे द्वारा पूर्व में ली गई अपराध समीक्षा बैठक एवं वीडियो कॉन्फ्रेंसिंग के माध्यम से जिले के सभी थाना प्रभारियों को थानाक्षेत्र में अवैध गतिविधियों पर अंकुश लगाने एवं आ-सूचना संलकन को सुदृढ बनाये जाने हेतु निर्देशित किया गया है। किन्तु थाना मानपुर क्षेत्रांतर्गत इतने बड़े पैमाने पर जुओं पकड़े जाने से यह स्पष्ट है कि थाना प्रभारी मानपुर एवं बीट प्रभारी, आ-सूचना संकलन करने एवं वरिष्ठ अधिकारियों द्वारा दिये गये निर्देशों का पालन करने में असफल रहे हैं। जो कि इनकी कर्तव्य के प्रति घोर लापरवाही एवं संदिग्ध आचरण को प्रदर्शित करता है।

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अतः निरीक्षक लोकेन्द्र सिंह हिहोर थाना प्रभारी-मानपुर एवं ग्राम आवलीपुरा के बीट प्रभारी उनि मिथुन ओसारी एवं सउनि रेशम गिरवाल तैनात थाना मानपुर जिला इन्दौर (ग्रामीण) को उपरोक्तानुसार प्रदर्शित कृत्य के लिए तत्काल प्रभाव से निलंबित कर रक्षित केन्द्र जिला इन्दौर (ग्रामीण) सम्बद्ध किया जाता है। निलंबन अवधि में नियमानुसार जीवन निर्वाह भत्ता पाने की पात्रता होगी एवं विना अनुमति मुख्यालय नहीं छोड़ेगें।“

17. It is trite law that the power of suspension is not a punitive measure but a protective step in aid of a contemplated inquiry. The legal contours governing suspension have been succinctly enumerated in the case of **M.P. State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Save, 2008 SCC OnLine MP 242 : (2008) 4 MP LJ 235 : (2009) 2 SLR 72 at page 2216 which reads as under:-**

“7. In this context, we think it apt to refer to Rule 9(1) of 1966 Rules. The said Rule is reproduced below:—

“9. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension:—

(a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or

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(b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation inquiry or trial:

Provided that a Government servant shall invariably be placed under suspension when a challan for a criminal offence involving corruption or other moral turpitude is filed against him:

Provided further that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made.”

“We have reproduced the said Rule to understand the basic tenor of it. In this context it is essential to scan the other rules so that a complete picture is projected. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 9 deals with the concept of deemed suspension and other, aspects relating to the same. Sub Rule (3) of Rule 9 provides the consequences when the punishment imposed against a Government servant under suspension is set-aside in appeal or in review. Sub Rule (4) deals with the situation where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set-aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of Court of law. Sub Rule (5) of Rule 9 stipulates that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9 to continue to remain in

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force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. The aforesaid are the basic features of Rule 9. The Rule is absolutely silent as regards the situation when a judgment of acquittal is recorded against the accused employee.”

18. In the landmark pronouncement of **State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, (1994) 4 SCC 126 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 875 : 1994 SCC OnLine SC 116 at page 132**, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the requisite application of mind necessary for passing such an order as:-

“13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an

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automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental



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inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.”

19. Further elucidating the contours of judicial review in suspension matters and deprecating vindictive administrative actions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 405 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1031** at page 162, held:

“21. The power of suspension should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner and without any reasonable ground or as vindictive misuse of power. Suspension should be made only in a case where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent employee and the allegations involving moral turpitude, grave misconduct or indiscipline or refusal to carry out the orders of superior authority are there, or there is a strong prima facie case against him, if proved, would ordinarily result in reduction in rank, removal or dismissal from service. The authority should also take into account all the available material as to whether in a given case, it is advisable to allow the delinquent to continue to perform his duties in the office or his retention in office is likely to hamper or frustrate the inquiry.

22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or

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commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee's continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank, etc.

23. *In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Nathubhai Patel [(2006) 8 SCC 200] this Court explained : (SCC p. 209, para 18)*

“18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint,



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albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.”

20. Touching upon the human element and the deleterious effects of arbitrary suspension, the Apex Court in **M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810 : 1999 SCC OnLine SC 360** at page 693, observed:

“29. Exercise of right to suspend an employee may be justified on the facts of a particular case. Instances, however, are not rare where officers have been found to be afflicted by a “suspension syndrome” and the employees have been found to be placed under suspension just for nothing. It is their irritability rather than the employee's trivial lapse which has often resulted in suspension. Suspension notwithstanding, non-payment of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. When the employee is placed

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under suspension, he is demobilised and the salary is also paid to him at a reduced rate under the nickname of “subsistence allowance”, so that the employee may sustain himself. This Court, in O.P. Gupta v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 328 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 400 : (1987) 5 ATC 14] made the following observations with regard to subsistence allowance: (SCC p. 340, para 15)

*“An order of suspension of a government servant does not put an end to his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of suspension as explained by this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 300 : (1959) 1 LLJ 167] is that he continues to be a member of the government service but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid only some allowance — generally called subsistence allowance — which is normally less than the salary instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that an order of suspension, unless the departmental enquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a government servant injuriously. The very expression ‘subsistence allowance’ has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘subsist’ as given in *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II at p. 2171* is ‘to remain alive as on food; to continue to exist’. ‘Subsistence’ means — means of*



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supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. Distilling the essence of the afore-quoted judicial pronouncements, this Court formulates the following guidelines to govern the present adjudication:

- i. Suspension is not a punishment, but a step in aid to the ultimate result of an investigation or inquiry. It forbids an employee from discharging duties to prevent them from scuttling the inquiry or tampering with evidence.
- ii. An order of suspension does not put an end to the service, but merely demobilizes the employee from working. It prevents further misconduct and removes the impression that dereliction of duty pays fruits.
- iii. Suspension affects an employee injuriously if the enquiry is not concluded within a reasonable time. Paying a reduced "subsistence allowance" to sustain life has an undeniable penal significance.
- iv. Suspension must not be an administrative routine, an automatic order, or driven by a "suspension syndrome" over trivial lapses. It cannot be exercised arbitrarily, without reasonable ground, or as a vindictive misuse of power.
- v. The disciplinary authority must actively apply its mind to the gravity of the alleged misconduct and the nature of the evidence. It must weigh the public



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- interest and whether retaining the employee will hamper the inquiry.
- vi. A suspension order requires a strong prima facie case involving moral turpitude, grave misconduct, indiscipline, or refusal to follow orders. The charges, if proved, must ordinarily warrant major punishment like removal or dismissal.
 - vii. Ordinarily, the Court will not interfere, as suspension is the exclusive domain of the competent authority. No standardized formula applies, the Court must consider each case strictly on its own facts.
 - viii. The scope of judicial review is limited to deficiencies in the decision-making process, not the decision itself. The Court intervenes only if the administrative decision is illogical, suffers from procedural impropriety, or shocks the conscience.
 - ix. Judicial review is strictly made out if charges are baseless, actuated by mala fides, or framed merely to keep the employee jobless. The Court will also strike down decisions based on wholly irrelevant considerations.
 - x. The Court will interfere if the order lacks even prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct. However, it will not interfere if reaching a conclusion requires examining the entire evidentiary record.
22. Adverting to the factual anvil of the present case and applying the aforesaid principles, it is manifestly clear that the suspension order suffers from gross legal infirmity. Firstly, the

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suspension is wholly disproportionate and incongruous to the alleged act or omission. A bare perusal of the impugned order reveals the sole reason ascribed:

"मेरे द्वारा पूर्व में ली गई अपराध समीक्षा बैठक एवं वीडियो कॉन्फ्रेंसिंग के माध्यम से जिले के सभी थाना प्रभारियों को थानाक्षेत्र में अवैध गतिविधियों पर अंकुश लगाने एवं आ-सूचना संलकन को सुदृढ बनाये जाने हेतु निर्देशित किया गया है। किन्तु थाना मानपुर क्षेत्रांतर्गत इतने बड़े पैमाने पर जुआँ पकड़े जाने से यह स्पष्ट है कि थाना प्रभारी मानपुर एवं बीट प्रभारी, आ-सूचना संकलन करने एवं वरिष्ठ अधिकारियों द्वारा दिये गये निर्देशों का पालन करने में असफल रहे हैं। जो कि इनकी कर्तव्य के प्रति घोर लापरवाही एवं संदिग्ध आचरण को प्रदर्शित करता है।"

Strikingly, the State has failed to place on record any specific operational directive or statutory instruction that was purportedly violated by the petitioner. The justification hinges entirely on a sweeping, generalized allegation of a failure to gather intelligence, which is factually contradicted by the petitioner's own successful intelligence-based raid.

23. Secondly, there is an absolute dearth of any prima facie material to establish moral turpitude, grave misconduct, indiscipline, or refusal to follow orders. The undisputed position on record dictates that the petitioner, acting upon an informant's tip during a routine night patrol, promptly secured a search warrant, mobilized independent witnesses, and successfully executed a raid, neutralizing a large-scale gambling operation. Penalizing a law



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enforcement officer for the prompt, efficient, and successful execution of his statutory duties is antithetical to the very concept of 'grave misconduct' and shocks the conscience of this Court.

24. Furthermore, the sequence of undisputed events strongly militates against the respondents and points toward malice in law. The petitioner, despite facing immense external pressure to suppress the identity of the crime scene being the private farmhouse of an IAS officer demonstrated unwavering integrity by ensuring the FIR reflected the true and correct facts. The immediate issuance of the suspension order on the very next morning, coupled with the glaring non-application of mind evident in the simultaneous suspension of an ASI who was admittedly on sick leave, and the differential treatment meted out to the SHO of Simrol Police Station under identical circumstances, undeniably exposes a 'pick and choose' policy driven by a vindictive mindset rather than administrative exigency.

25. It is highly pertinent to note that the petitioner in his writ petition has taken a clear, categorical, and grave stand that his suspension was the direct consequence of not honoring the undue pressure created upon him by higher authorities to alter the crime scene. It is striking and surprising that such a serious allegation of malice leveled against the respondents has neither been specifically



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nor categorically rebutted by them in their reply. This evasive silence further affirms the petitioner's contention that the suspension is entirely born out of his refusal to obey illegal dictates and undue pressure.

26. Further scrutinizing the preliminary enquiry conducted by the respondents, it is conspicuously devoid of the statements of any independent witnesses with regard to the circumstances warranting the suspension. Moreover, the findings of the Enquiry Officer are inherently contradictory. On one hand, during the appreciation of facts, the officer observes that the petitioner is not directly liable; yet, at the time of drawing the conclusion, he abruptly recommends that the petitioner is liable to be suspended. It is also evident that the preliminary enquiry was heavily prejudiced by the reliance on old cases of alleged misconduct against the petitioner, which have absolutely no nexus with the present incident and legally ought not to have been considered for passing the impugned order.

27. Addressing the preliminary objection regarding the availability of an alternative remedy, it is a well-recognized exception that the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience, and discretion, rather than a rigid mandate of law. Where the impugned action is ex-facie arbitrary, suffers from the vice of non-application of mind, and is completely devoid



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of any prima facie material to constitute grave misconduct, relegating the petitioner to the appellate authority would be an exercise in futility. This is further substantiated by the retaliatory development that immediately after the filing of the present writ petition, the petitioner was transferred from his current place of posting. Such a vindictive action clearly indicates that the statutory appeal would be entirely illusory and this Court does not find that the appeal would be an efficacious remedy for the petitioner.

28. Furthermore, neither in the entire order of suspension nor in the preliminary enquiry had it been substantiated, nor a whisper has been made of the fact, that the said incident was within the prior knowledge of the petitioner which could have invited the order of suspension.

29. It is a settled proposition of law that a Constitutional Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, normally refrains from interfering with an order of suspension, as it falls squarely within the administrative domain of the disciplinary authority. However, in special facts and circumstances like those existing in the present case where the respondents have glaringly failed to deny the specific and grave stand made by the petitioner regarding the pressure to change the crime scene it becomes the solemn duty of this Court to interfere.



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The impugned order prima facie appears to have been passed in an arbitrary, colorable, and vindictive manner, leaving the Court with no option but to step in to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. If these types of stereotype orders of suspension, like in the present case, are permitted to continue, then no officer would even dare to raid any premises due to fear of suspension.

30. In the conspectus of the aforesaid factual and legal analysis, the impugned action cannot be sustained. The writ petition is accordingly **allowed**. The impugned suspension order dated 11.03.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Superintendent of Police, District Indore (Gramin) is hereby **quashed and set aside**. Furthermore, all consequential actions arising out of only the said suspension are also hereby **quashed**. However, liberty is granted to the respondents to take further suitable action in accordance with due process of law, if at all required.

31. Pending applications, if any, are **disposed of** accordingly. No order as to costs.

(Jai Kumar Pillai)
Judge