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Dying Declaration of Woman and Child’s Testimony Enough to Summon In-Laws Under Section 319 CrPC: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court held that the statements of a deceased woman and her minor daughter were sufficient to summon the in-laws as accused under Section 319 CrPC. SC said the dying declaration and the child’s testimony provided grounds.

New Delhi: The Supreme Court ruled that the statements made by a deceased woman and her minor daughter are adequate to summon in-laws as additional defendants in a murder case while considering an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

A Bench consisting of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh set-aside a decision by the Allahabad High Court, which had upheld the trial court’s denial to summon the deceased woman’s mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and other relatives.

The case involves the murder of Smt. Nishi, who was allegedly shot by her husband at their matrimonial residence. Following the incident, her brother, Neeraj Kumar alias Neeraj Yadav, lodged an FIR on March 25, 2021, after being informed by Nishi’s nine-year-old daughter that her father had shot her mother. Nishi unfortunately succumbed to her injuries on May 15, 2021.

Before her passing, Nishi identified her husband Rahul as the shooter and implicated her mother-in-law Rajo alias Rajwati, brother-in-law Satan alias Vineet, and another relative named Gabbar, claiming they instigated the act. Both statements were recorded on video during the investigation.

Initially, the police filed a charge sheet solely against the husband under Sections 302 and 316 of the Indian Penal Code, omitting the in-laws. After charges were laid, the minor daughter testified in court that her father had shot her mother at the behest of the in-laws. Based on this, the prosecution filed a Section 319 CrPC application to summon them as additional defendants.

The trial court denied this application, and the Allahabad High Court upheld this decision on April 22, 2024, arguing that the minor child was not an eyewitness to the shooting and highlighting various omissions and inconsistencies in the statements.

Reversing this judgment, the Supreme Court underscored that the purpose of Section 319 CrPC is to ensure that no guilty party evades legal accountability.

The Court noted that while the power under Section 319 is extraordinary and discretionary, the satisfaction level required for its exercise is higher than that needed at the charge framing stage but lower than that for a conviction.

The Bench concluded that the statements from the complainant and the minor daughter, when considered alongside the deceased’s statements recorded during the investigation, provided prima facie evidence of the in-laws’ involvement.

It found the objections raised by the respondents allegations of tutoring the child witness, omissions from the FIR, inconsistencies, and lack of medical certification were premature and could not be conclusively addressed at the summoning stage.

The Court emphasized that an FIR need not include every minor detail of the incident; its main function is to initiate the criminal process. It held that the High Court incorrectly determined the child was not an eyewitness, noting that making such inferences at the Section 319 stage equates to evaluating evidence, which is not permissible.

The Bench further stressed that in deciding an application under Section 319 CrPC, courts should not assess the credibility or probative value of evidence, but rather consider whether the existing material indicates the involvement of the proposed accused.

Disregarding claims that the minor child might have been influenced or coached, the Court pointed out her consistent identification of the in-laws in her Section 161 CrPC statement. While these statements do not qualify as substantive evidence on their own, they serve for corroboration when exercising powers under Section 319.

Regarding the deceased’s statements, the Bench clarified that such statements become relevant as dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act after the declarant’s death. The lack of a Magistrate’s presence or medical certification concerning her mental fitness does not automatically make these statements inadmissible.

The Court also stated that the time elapsed between the recording of the statements and the woman’s death did not diminish their evidentiary significance. It is crucial that these statements relate to the cause of death or the events leading to it.

Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the appeal and directed all parties to appear before the trial court on January 8, 2026. It also clarified that the remarks made in the judgment were limited to the Section 319 application decision and should not be interpreted as determinations on the case’s merits.

A dying declaration is a statement made by a person who is about to die, explaining the cause of their death or the circumstances leading to it. The law accepts it as evidence because a person who is dying is presumed to speak the truth.

This section creates an exception to the rule that hearsay evidence is not allowed.

Case Title: Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors



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