The Supreme Court heard petitions challenging the Special Intensive Revision of Bihar’s electoral rolls, raising concerns about de novo preparation of voter lists and citizenship checks. Petitioners argued the process is arbitrary, excludes voters, and exceeds the Election Commission’s statutory powers.
New Delhi: The Supreme Court on Thursday once again took up a batch of petitions led by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) challenging the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar, amid continuing concerns over procedural fairness and the protection of voters’ rights.
The petitions have been filed against the Election Commission of India (ECI). They are being heard by a Bench comprising the Chief Justice of India and Justice Joymalya Bagchi of the Supreme Court of India.
Senior advocate Prashant Bhushan opened the submissions for the petitioners. During the hearing, political activist Yogendra Yadav highlighted what he described as deep structural flaws in the manner in which the SIR is being conducted in Bihar.
He submitted that the process has resulted in two disturbing outcomes — first, a significant reduction in the number of registered voters compared to the adult population in the constituency, and second, a noticeable imbalance between the percentage of women voters and men voters.
According to the submissions, this structural problem has arisen because, unlike earlier revisions, the present SIR seeks to prepare the voters’ list entirely afresh, as if starting from a clean slate. It was pointed out that such a method has never been adopted in the past.
Reference was made to the earlier SIR conducted in 2003, where the existing electoral roll was taken as the base.
At that time, the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) or Booth Level Officer (BLO) went door to door to verify who was residing in each household. The petitioners argued that this was the accepted and lawful method of conducting an intensive revision.
The submissions further stressed that even in earlier instances, the Election Commission recorded detailed reasons explaining why there was a serious problem with the voters’ list in a particular constituency before considering any extraordinary exercise.
Otherwise, it was argued,
“never ever in the history of this country has a voters list been attempted to be prepared de novo and especially in such a hurry.”
Raising serious concerns about citizenship determination, Adv Prashant Bhushan questioned how the Election Commission or the ERO could lawfully decide questions of citizenship during such an exercise.
He submitted that if EROs are given the power to determine citizenship, it remains unclear how such determinations would be made. He argued that the only documents that could even prima facie indicate citizenship — such as passports or birth certificates — are themselves not foolproof and can be erroneous.
He further explained that in many cases, individuals may not possess documentary proof. In such situations, long-settled legal principles allow citizens to establish their status through affidavits, supported by statements from neighbours or other local residents who can testify that the person was born and has lived in India.
According to him, such evidence is normally considered sufficient unless someone seeking to displace that claim produces concrete proof showing, for instance, that the person was born in another country or appears in a foreign voter list.
He argued that it is practically impossible for ordinary citizens to prove place of birth purely through documents, and that oral and circumstantial evidence has always played an important role in such determinations.
Adv Prashant Bhushan also reminded the Court that in earlier exercises, including the 2003 SIR and the 2004 Assam guidelines, the Election Commission itself had consistently maintained that enumerators should not decide questions of citizenship. Instead, their role was limited to flagging doubtful cases and referring them to the appropriate competent authorities, who would then decide the issue after examining all evidence.
Addressing the issue of “machine-readable” electoral data, Bhushan submitted that the term merely means that data can be searched and processed electronically, and that it does not create any new legal obligation.
He argued that
“Reliance on the Kamalnath judgment was misplaced, as that decision did not absolve the Election Commission of its responsibilities. On the contrary, it expressly recognised that political parties or citizens could themselves convert the data into a machine-readable form using their own resources, and that the Court at that time found no need to issue further directions.”
He further submitted that
“even if, without conceding, a de novo preparation of the electoral roll were assumed to be legally permissible, such an exercise could not be carried out arbitrarily. Requiring every voter to submit fresh enumeration forms and supporting documents could only be contemplated if the entire process was transparent, rule-based and structured.”
He emphasised that
“such an exercise could not vest arbitrary powers in the authorities to decide questions of citizenship, as that would be wholly impermissible in law. According to him, the electoral machinery cannot assume an adjudicatory role that the statute does not confer.”
After Adv Prashant Bhushan concluded his submissions, counsel appearing for another set of petitioners addressed the Court, stating that the petitioners were ordinary citizens of Bihar who had approached the Supreme Court seeking protection of the statutory framework governing elections.
The counsel traced the legislative history of Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, pointing out that in 1966, the only amendment to Section 21(1) was the insertion of the words “unless the Election Commission for reasons to be recorded otherwise directs.”
The counsel explained that a de novo or fresh preparation of the electoral roll necessarily operates in conjunction with Rule 25(2) of the Registration of Electors Rules. Rule 25(2), which applies whenever an intensive revision is undertaken, not only prescribes the manner in which such revision must be carried out but also makes applicable Rules 4 to 23. According to the submissions, even a plain reading of Rule 25(2) makes this position clear and unambiguous.
It was further argued that although there has been no Special Intensive Revision since 2003, the Election Commission does not violate Section 21(2) merely because that provision provides flexibility.
However, the phrase “unless otherwise directed” only empowers the Commission to relax the timing or frequency of revisions — it does not authorise the Commission to change the manner in which a revision, once undertaken, must be conducted.
Elaborating on Section 21(3), the counsel submitted that when the statute uses the expression “in such manner,” it necessarily refers to the manner prescribed in the Rules. The law recognises only two forms of revision — summary and intensive — and both are exhaustively detailed in the Rules.
Rule 25 governs both, with intensive revision specifically covered under Rule 25(2). According to the petitioners, Section 21(3) does not suspend or override Rule 25(2); it merely relaxes the requirement of when a revision must be conducted, not how it must be conducted.
In conclusion, the counsel strongly opposed the suggestion that the SIR exercise is legislative in character and therefore immune under Article 324 of the Constitution.
He submitted that
“such a characterisation is contrary to settled law laid down by both a Constitution Bench and a later three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court. Article 324, he argued, does not confer power on the Election Commission to amend statutes or rules. The field is already fully occupied by law, and the Election Commission must function strictly within that framework and not beyond it.”
The matter remains under consideration before the Supreme Court, with significant implications for electoral processes, voter inclusion, and the limits of the Election Commission’s powers during intensive revisions of electoral rolls.
Case Title:
ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND ORS. Versus ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA [W.P.(C) No. 640/2025 PIL-W].
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