The Delhi High Court set aside a Family Court order denying waiver of the mandatory one-year waiting period for mutual consent divorce. A bench of Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Renu Bhatnagar held that forcing a non-consummated marriage causes hardship.
NEW DELHI: The Delhi High Court has set aside a Family Court decision that denied a request to waive the mandatory one-year waiting period for filing a mutual consent divorce petition.
The Division Bench, consisting of Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Renu Bhatnagar, held that enforcing a continuation of a marriage that has never been consummated and exists solely in legal terms creates “exceptional hardship” for the parties involved.
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Case Background
The appeal (MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025) contested an order dated December 9, 2025, issued by the Principal Judge, Family Court-02, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi. The couple had solemnized their marriage on March 30, 2025, at an Arya Samaj Mandir, followed by registration on April 2, 2025. It was acknowledged that the couple “never cohabited even for a single day” and that the marriage was “never consummated.”
Immediately after the ceremony, they continued to live separately at their parental homes. Due to irreconcilable differences evident from the outset, the couple filed a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) within seven months of their marriage. They also submitted an application under Section 14 of the HMA seeking permission to file their petition before the mandatory one-year period had elapsed.
The Family Court dismissed this application, ruling that the parties had not demonstrated a case for “exceptional hardship.” It noted that the couple had not made adequate efforts to salvage the marriage and pointed out that the marriage registration shortly after the ceremony “diluted their claim of exceptional hardship.”
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel for both the Appellant and the Respondent argued that the Respondent currently resides in Canada, while the Appellant remains in India. The Appellant is responsible for caring for her elderly parents and cannot relocate, while the Respondent also faces challenges in moving to India.
The parties maintained that these unavoidable circumstances resulted in continued separation with “no realistic or practical possibility of resuming matrimonial life,” thereby fulfilling the criteria for exceptional hardship.
Court’s Observations and Analysis
The High Court analyzed Sections 13-B(1) and 14 of the HMA. Section 14(1) prevents the consideration of a divorce petition within a year of marriage unless the case demonstrates “exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent.”
The Bench referenced a recent Full Bench ruling from the Delhi High Court in Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar (Decided on 17.12.2025), which clarified that the statutory one-year period can be waived if the court finds evidence of exceptional hardship.
Applying this legal framework to the case at hand, the Court stated,
“In the present case, the admitted facts demonstrate that the parties never cohabited, the marriage was never consummated, and they have lived separately since the very inception of the marriage. There are no children from the wedlock, nor is there any reasonable probability of their living together in future. These facts are not in dispute and strike at the very foundation of a subsisting matrimonial relationship.”
The Court disagreed with the Family Court’s reasoning regarding the registration of the marriage.
It asserted,
“Registration of marriage is merely a statutory mandate, and by itself, cannot be determinative of matrimonial harmony, intention to cohabit, or the viability of the marital relationship.”
Moreover, concerning the Family Court’s stance on preserving the marriage, the High Court remarked,
“Where the marriage has never been acted upon by the parties through cohabitation, the question of saving such a marriage does not meaningfully arise.”
Decision
The Court concluded that refusing to waive the waiting period would force the parties to endure a relationship devoid of any substance.
It said,
“Insisting upon continuation of a marriage which exists only in law, and not in substance, would amount to compelling the parties to endure a relationship devoid of any matrimonial foundation, thereby causing avoidable hardship rather than advancing the object of the statute.”
Thus, the High Court allowed the appeal and annulled the Family Court’s order from December 9, 2025. The application under Section 14 of the HMA was granted, allowing the parties to immediately file their joint petition for mutual consent divorce without waiting for the expiration of one year.
The matter was returned to the Family Court to expedite proceedings under Section 13-B of the HMA.
Case Title: NUPUR GARG versus DWARKESH AHUJA
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