The Rajasthan High Court held that criminal contempt law does not protect judges’ personal ego. It clarified that personal criticism of a presiding officer, without affecting justice administration or scandalising the institution, ordinarily does not amount to criminal contempt.
RAJASTHAN: The Rajasthan High Court recently observed that the law on criminal contempt is not designed to protect the personal prestige or ego of individual judges. A Division Bench comprising Justices Farjand Ali and Yogendra Kumar Purohit further held that personal criticism of judges that is unlikely to scandalise the Court does not constitute criminal contempt.
The judgment states,
“The law of criminal contempt is not meant to protect the personal prestige or ego of Presiding Officer as an individual. Personal criticism or allegations directed against an individual Presiding Officer, without any tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or to scandalise the institution of the Court, would not ordinarily fall within the ambit of criminal contempt,”
The Court explained that contempt law aims to preserve the dignity, authority, and effective functioning of the Court as an institution. For conduct to amount to criminal contempt, it must be aimed at the Court and have the potential to undermine public confidence in the judicial system, rather than merely wounding the personal sensitivities of the presiding judge.
The Court said,
“The law of contempt is concerned solely with preserving the dignity, authority, and effective functioning of the Court as an institution. For an act to constitute criminal contempt, it must be directed against the Court and must have the tendency to undermine public confidence in the judicial system, rather than merely affecting the personal sensibilities of the individual presiding over the Bench,”
The Bench added that simply alleging that a judge acted improperly does not automatically amount to imputing impropriety to the court or its judicial functioning, and thus does not necessarily qualify as contempt.
It further said,
“An individual may be criticised for his conduct, but that cannot automatically be equated with criticism of the Court or its judgments. The judiciary derives its strength from public confidence. Such confidence is strengthened not by suppressing grievances but by ensuring that genuine complaints are examined in a fair and transparent manner,”
Even harsh or unpleasant criticism will not fall under criminal contempt when it is confined to the personal conduct of an individual, the Court stressed. Criminal contempt jurisdiction is not intended to silence grievances or shield judicial officers from criticism.
The case arose from a contempt reference filed by an Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) against seven police officers, including an Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP). The ACJM alleged that the officers had committed criminal contempt through their statements during an inquiry, which the ASP conducted into allegations of improper investigation in a rape case.
During the inquiry, the police reportedly told the officer that the ACJM frequently mistreated police and court staff, intentionally impeded the filing of police reports, and made officers wait long periods in degrading circumstances. They said the ACJM’s conduct created a climate of fear among officers, hampered coordination between the court and investigators, and eroded mutual institutional respect.
The officers also informed the inquiry that a complaint had been lodged against the ACJM with the Registrar (Vigilance), and suggested the ACJM harboured resentment against the police.
The High Court pointed out that these remarks were recorded in a case diary, which is not publicly accessible.
The Bench observed,
“These statements were not made in a public forum, not in any publication, and not with any intention to scandalise the institution of the judiciary, but rather in response to questions posed by a superior officer during the course of an official inquiry ordered by the Presiding Officer,”
The Court noted that the officers were recounting their perceptions and grievances “regarding the behavior of an individual” to a superior conducting an inquiry.
It found no criticism of any judicial order in the statements, nor any attack on the majesty or authority of the Court. The Bench said a person who has been humiliated or believes they have been wronged cannot be expected to remain silent, and that the law does not bar truthful accounts given to a competent authority during an inquiry.
The Bench said,
“The statements do not appear to contain any criticism of a judicial order, nor do they cast aspersions upon the majesty of the court or the judicial institution. A person who has faced humiliation or perceives that he has been subjected to improper behaviour cannot be expected to remain silent. The law does not impose a gag order upon truthfully narrating facts, particularly when such narration is made before a competent authority conducting an inquiry,”
Noting the pending vigilance complaints against the ACJM, the Court warned that treating the filing of complaints about a Presiding Officer as criminal contempt would render the vigilance process ineffective and deter genuine grievances.
It said,
“If the mere act of submitting a complaint regarding the conduct of a Presiding Officer were to be treated as criminal contempt, the entire vigilance mechanism would become redundant and ineffective. Such an interpretation would have the chilling effect of discouraging individuals from raising genuine grievances and would ultimately undermine the principles of fairness, transparency, and institutional accountability.”
The Bench drew a clear line between personal criticism of a judicial officer and attacks on the dignity of the Court.
It said,
“In the context of criminal contempt, the concern of law is not the personal feelings or reputation of the individual officer who happens to be presiding over the Bench. Rather, the law is intended to safeguard the dignity, authority, and orderly functioning of the Court as an institution. The jurisdiction relating to criminal contempt is invoked only when an act tends to scandalise the Court, lower the authority of the Court, prejudice or interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice,”
Ultimately, the Court held that the police officers’ statements to their superior could not be taken as scandalising the Court, interfering with proceedings, or diminishing the Court’s dignity and majesty.
The High Court said,
“Criminal contempt jurisdiction is not intended to silence grievances or shield judicial officers from criticism, unless such criticism transgresses into deliberate vilification or an attack on the institution of justice itself,”
The court dismissed the reference.
Additional Advocate General Sajjan Singh Rathore appeared for the State.
Case Title: In Re vs Dilip Kumar Saini
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