The Supreme Court’s recent decision on remission exclusion missed a crucial opportunity to establish clear and consistent guidelines, leaving legal uncertainties unresolved.
NEW DELHI: A recent Supreme Court decision has once again highlighted the inconsistency in sentencing policies, particularly concerning the exclusion of remission in life imprisonment cases. This decision, along with previous rulings, raises critical concerns about judicial reasoning and the principles guiding sentencing, particularly in cases where the death penalty is commuted to life imprisonment.
The Naika Judgment and Its Implications
On 13th February 2025, in Ramesh A. Naika v The Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court commuted a death sentence imposed by the Trial Court and upheld by the Karnataka High Court. The Court ruled that
“the convict, found guilty of murdering his children, would serve life imprisonment “without remission” until his natural death”
While the Supreme Court upheld the findings on guilt, it diverged on sentencing, considering the convict’s lack of prior criminal history as a mitigating factor
The Court also noted that his past actions, such as assisting his sister-in-law in securing employment—despite later being found guilty of murdering her—indicated some degree of positive behavior.
However, it rejected his desire to serve elders as a valid mitigating factor and found no substantive issues in the Trial Court’s reasoning regarding the circumstantial evidence.
Despite these mitigating circumstances, the Supreme Court imposed a life sentence without remission, barring the convict from the possibility of early release. The judgment provides no detailed reasoning for this decision, raising concerns about consistency and transparency in sentencing.
Life Imprisonment Without Remission: The “Other Death Penalty”
The judgment is notably silent on the rationale for denying remission, a critical aspect of sentencing in life imprisonment cases. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the executive has the discretion to grant remission to convicts serving life sentences after they have completed at least 14 years in prison. This allows for an individualized review of the convict’s conduct and potential for rehabilitation.
However, in Swamy Shraddananda v State of Karnataka (2008) and Union of India v V. Sriharan (2015), the Supreme Court introduced a category of life sentences where remission is entirely excluded. These rulings created a legal precedent allowing courts to impose sentences of life imprisonment without any possibility of executive review, effectively making it a punishment akin to the death penalty in terms of its finality.
In October 2024, while dismissing a review petition against Swamy Shraddananda, a three-judge bench clarified that even when remission is judicially barred, convicts retain the right to seek clemency under Article 72 (Presidential pardon) or Article 161 (Governor’s pardon). However, this avenue is rarely exercised, and its application remains largely uncertain and discretionary.
Legal scholars such as Vibha Swaminathan and Diya Maria Abraham, writing on the Constitutional Law and Philosophy blog, criticized this approach as a missed opportunity to evaluate whether life imprisonment without remission is fundamentally different from the death penalty in terms of liberty and dignity. Similarly, human rights lawyer Madhurima Dhanuka has emphasized
“ the urgent need to assess the human rights implications of this so-called “other death penalty.”
Precedent Tables in the Naika Order: A Flawed Classification
The Naika judgment attempts to justify its decision by presenting two tables of past Supreme Court cases.
One table lists instances where death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment without remission, while the other details cases where remission remained an option. Each table includes brief case facts and reasons for the commutation.
However, the classification appears arbitrary. The Court does not explain why the circumstances in cases listed under the second table, where remission was allowed, do not apply to Naika’s case. The tables provide bullet-pointed summaries without establishing a clear link between the circumstances of the crime and the decision on remission, making it difficult to discern any guiding principle.
Neetika Vishwanath, Director of Sentencing at Project-39A, has highlighted
“the broader issue of inadequate reasoning in sentencing orders across all judicial levels”
She argues that decisions barring remission are often justified purely on the brutality of the crime—a weak standard given that all death-eligible offenses are inherently serious. Sentencing, she emphasizes, must consider both the crime and the individual circumstances of the accused, an approach seemingly ignored in Naika.
The Navas Judgment: A Missed Step Towards Clarity
In Navas @ Mulanavas v State of Kerala (2024), the Supreme Court made an attempt to provide some guidance on the question of remission in life sentences. The bench reviewed 27 past cases of death sentence commutations, categorizing them based on the period of imprisonment imposed without remission. The findings were as follows:
- Life without remission in 5 cases
- 30 years without remission in 9 cases
- 25 years without remission in 4 cases
- 20 years without remission in 6 cases
- Other varying terms in remaining cases
The Court concluded that
sentencing should follow the principle of proportionality, weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. In this case, it reduced the convict’s period of imprisonment without remission from 30 years to 25 years.
Despite this effort, it is argued that Navas fails to meaningfully engage with the function of remission, as it bases sentencing decisions solely on the nature of the crime rather than the convict’s post-offense rehabilitation. She contends that Navas, like Naika, falls short of establishing a coherent framework for remission decisions.
ALSO READ: Rhea Chakraborty Claims 80% of Women in Prison Are Innocent – Is Justice Too Slow?
A Pending Five-Judge Bench Reference: The Opportunity for Reform
Vishwanath warns that the increasing judicial trend of barring remission in death commutations is concerning, as it undermines the rehabilitative principle of sentencing. She notes that the Court’s emphasis on achieving uniformity in outcomes, rather than consistency in sentencing processes, is problematic. Instead of merely comparing crimes, she argues, courts should ensure a fair and individualized sentencing approach for all convicts.
In 2022, the Supreme Court referred a suo motu case to a five-judge bench to establish guidelines on mitigating factors in sentencing. The referral stemmed from conflicting rulings on whether sentencing hearings should be bifurcated from conviction proceedings. The Court’s stated
“aim was to guarantee that convicts receive a “real and meaningful opportunity” to present mitigating circumstances before sentencing”
Whether this reference will be expanded to clarify the selective denial of remission remains to be seen. However, judgments like Naika highlight the urgency of such clarification. The inconsistency in sentencing standards, the arbitrary classification of precedents, and the lack of judicial engagement with remission’s rehabilitative purpose all point to the pressing need for a structured and principled approach to life imprisonment sentencing.
Without such a framework, the judicial system risks eroding the fundamental principles of justice, fairness, and rehabilitation in criminal sentencing.
READ COMPLETE ANALYSIS ON THIS CASE
READ JUDGEMENT HERE:
READ MORE REPORTS ON REMISSION
FOR MORE LEGAL UPDATES FOLLOW US ON YOUTUBE
